Here we present an overview and data description of the global structured metapopulation model used in the paper. The model we use is a data driven [1, 2, 3] global stochastic epidemic model, based on a metapopulation approach. Based on real demographic and mobility data, it considers the world population subdivided into geographic census areas defined around transportation hubs and connected by mobility fluxes, thus defining a subpopulation network. Within each subpopulation, a compartmental structure models the disease spread among individuals. Individuals can move from one subpopulation to another, along the mobility network: in this way, an outbreak originated in a seed subpopulation can lead to a global scale epidemic. This global epidemic and mobility (GLEaM) model can simulate human transmissible disease, and also allows the implementation of a wide range of intervention strategies -including vaccinations, antiviral treatment and travel restrictions -that can be temporally and geographically dependent, to model the different measures adopted by countries in response to an ongoing pandemic. The GLEaM model architecture integrates three different data layers: (i) the population layer, (ii) the transportation mobility layer and (iii) the epidemic layer. In the following we provide a description of the main materials and methods used in each layer.
The population dataset is from the Web sites of the "Gridded Population of the World" and the "Global Urban-Rural Mapping" projects [4, 5] , which are run by the Socioeconomic Data and Application Center (SEDAC) of Columbia University. According to this dataset, the surface of the world is divided into a grid of cells that can have different resolution levels. Each of these cells has been assigned an estimated population value.
Out of the possible resolutions, we have opted for cells of 15 × 15 minutes of arc to constitute the basis of our model. This corresponds to an area of each cell approximately equivalent to a rectangle of 25 × 25 kms along the Equator. The dataset comprises 823 680 cells, of which 250 206 are populated. Since the coordinates of each cell and those of the airports in the World Airport Network are known, the distance between the cells and the airports can be calculated. We have performed a Voronoi-like tessellation of Figure 1 : Population database and Voronoi tessellation around main transportation hubs. The world surface is represented in a grid-like partition where each cell -corresponding to a population values -is assigned to the closest airport. Geographical census areas emerge that constitute the sub-populations of the metapopulation model. the Earth surface assigning each cell to the closest airport that satisfies the following two conditions: (i) Each cell is assigned to the closest transportation hub within the same country. And (ii), the distance between the airport and the cell cannot be longer than 200 kms. Each Voronoi tessel thus defines a census area (subpopulation). This cutoff naturally emerges from the distribution of distances between cells and closest airports, and it is introduced to avoid that in barely populated areas such as Siberia we can generate geographical census areas thousands of kilometer wide but with almost no population. It also corresponds to a reasonable upper cutoff for the ground traveling distance expected to be covered to reach an airport before traveling by plane. Further attributes, such as demographic structure, economic indicators and specific mobility patterns can be associated to each census area. from country to country. For example, most European countries adhere to a practice that ranks administrative divisions in terms of geocoding for statistical purposes, the so called Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). Most countries in the European Union are partitioned into three NUTS levels which usually range from states to provinces. The commuting data at this level of resolution is therefore strongly coarse-grained. In order to have a higher geographical resolution of the commuting datasets that could match the resolution scale of our geographical census areas, we looked for smaller local administrative units (LAU) in Europe. The US or Canada report commuting at the level of counties. However, even within a single country the actual extension, shape, and population of the administrative divisions are usually a consequence of historical reasons and can be strongly heterogeneous.
The natural history of the disease and the epidemic layer
The epidemic model within each subpopulation considers a compartmental approach specific for the disease under study [10] . Each individual is assigned to a given disease state at each moment in time. Individuals transition from compartment to compartment by acquiring the infection or progressing along its multiple states. The number of individuals that transition between any two compartments is calculated using a chain binomial distribution whose rates are informed by the epidemic parameters. All the stochastic processes modeling the transitions of individuals in the different compartments and their mobility are mathematically defined through individual based stochastic chain binomial and multinomial processes [11, 12] to preserve the discrete and stochastic nature of the processes. Individuals are discrete but indistinguishable as no additional structure of the population (like e.g. households, workplaces) is considered. The GLEaM can include age structure and has been used for a side-by-side comparison with a stochastic agentbased model [13] . The specific compartmental structure of the disease is reported in the main text. Smallpox natural history is subdivided into three different stages, Latent, Prodromal and Rash. Upon infection, individuals spend an extended period of at least L d days incubating the infection in the Latent compartment, after which they progress with rate into the prodromal state. The Prodromal period, with an average duration of γ −1 days is characterized by fever and flu-like symptoms before finally displaying the typical liquid filled blisters that characterize smallpox rash. Rash, typically lasts I d days and is eventually followed by a late rash period after which recovery/death at a rate µ occurs. The relative infectiousness associated to the prodromal period and the different rash stages changes considerably in the literature [14, 15, 16] . The basic reproductive number R 0 gauging the transmissibility of the virus is a parameter of the model by acting on the transmissibility of the various stages of the disease. We have considered according to recent work [17, 18, 19, 20] that the prodromal period contributes 10%of the disease transmissibility and that during the late rash period the infectiousness of individuals is reduced by 90% because of the severity of the disease that leads to isolation and identification of the cases. The spreading rate of the disease is governed by the basic reproduction number R 0 tha is a function of the parameters defining the natural history of the disease [10] . In our case the basic reproduction number reads as:
In the case of smallpox the temporal progression of the disease imposes that individuals remain in specific compartments for a fixed minimum amount of time. In particular, individuals remain in the Latent (Early Rash) state for L d (I d ) full days following which they transition to the Prodromal (Late Rash) at a rate of ε (1). This type of disease structure can be implemented in a straightforward way within GLEaM model.
Human mobility and the worldwide impact of intentional localized highly pathogenic virus release L d extra compartment are created L 1 , · · · , L d and connected linearly to the next one with a transition rate of 1. Although transitions are assumed to be stochastic, by setting a rate of 1 we are in effect forcing every individual in compartment L 1 to transition to compartment L 2 at the end of the 1 day, thus moving them along the chain for a fixed amount of time. Individuals enter the chain at L 1 by transitioning from the Susceptible compartment upon coming in contact with an infectious person and transition out of L d at a rate ε on to the next stage of the disease. This formulation is not only conceptually simple, but it also allows for the tracking of individuals along the multiple compartments and the easy determination of how many people were exposed 1, 2, etc... days before. Another key feature of our model is the mobility of individuals. It is therefore extremely important to associate the different stages of the disease with different mobility and travel capabilities. In particular, only a fraction pt of individuals in the prodromal period are allowed to travel. Prodromal individuals capable of traveling are still allowed to travel with probability pr for Id days upon their progression to the rash stage [20] .
Simulation Implementation
For each set of disease parameters, the scenario, the computational model is used to generate numerically a large number of nominally identically initialized stochastic simulations of the global progression of the epidemic. The simulations provide for each point in space and time allowed by the resolution of the model the ensemble of possible epidemic evolution statistically defining the median, mean and reference range of the epidemic observables for the quantities of interest such a newly generated cases, exposed individuals etc. The GLEaM model is implemented in C/C++. A detailed description of the algorithmic structure of GLEaM is reported in Ref. [3] . Briefly, GLEaM is implemented in a modular way, where each module performs a specific function and can be added or removed according to the userÕs needs. The compartmental model and the epidemic parameters are defined in a configuration text file that is loaded at the program start. Subsequently, the program loads three data input files: the population database, the short-range mobility network and the long-range mobility network. During each time step, that represents a full day, the following modules are called in sequence: the air travel, the compartment transitions where the force of infection takes into account both the infection dynamics and the short-range movement of individuals, and the partial aggregation of the results at the desired level of geographic resolution. After the last time step, the program generates the final output, which can be further processed for analysis (see Fig.2 ). Custom scripts are then employed to generate the statistics and visualizations required for our analysis. A detailed explanation of the simulation framework can be seen in [3, 21] . The whole process is highly flexible and it can be tailored to the specific epidemic under study.
The average running time of a scenario depends on the number of simulated stochastic realizations of the model and the number of transitions between the epidemic compartments to be modeled. On a cluster with 20 CPUs (Intel Xeon 2Ghz), simulating 2,000 realizations of the model takes between three and five hours, depending on the complexity of the compartmentalization and the simulated interventions. Simulating one full pandemic scenario, corresponding to 2,000 realizations for three different seasonality values, on the same cluster took an average of 12 hours. The output of these two parts is then used to generate the final statistics and visualizations.
Sensitivity Analysis
One of the main challenges in modeling intentional smallpox release is the choice of key epidemiological parameters and natural history of smallpox infection. The contagiousness of the disease in present time population, the release method of the virus and many options in public health response Ð such as ring vaccination, mass vaccination, mobility restrictions Ð create a wide range of scenarios. In order to provide a thorough discussion of each possible scenario, we have performed an extensive sensitivity analysis of the key parameters defining the natural history of a smallpox-like pathogen.
Reproductive Ratio R 0
To analyze the impact of the value of the basic reproductive ratio, R 0 , we analyzed the results obtained by keeping all other parameters at baseline values while varying R 0 to 3 and 7. The results for the UK and the top 20 affected countries in each scenario, 14 days after the attack, are summarized in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 for the two seeding possibilities considered. As expected, in both cases, increasing the value of R 0 increases both the number of cases within each country and the respective outbreak probability.
Recovery Rate µ
To analyze the impact of the value of the recovery rate, µ, we analyzed the results obtained by keeping all other parameters at baseline values while varying µ to 3.6 and 11. The results for the UK and the top 20 affected countries in each scenario, 14 days after the attack, are summarized in Fig 5 and Fig 6 for the two seeding possibilities considered. Increasing the value of µ decreases both the number of cases within each country and the respective outbreak probability. This is due to the fact that we are considering the situation at a fixed amount of time after the initial outbreak. In this situation, and for the same value of R 0 , Human mobility and the worldwide impact of intentional localized highly pathogenic virus release Figure 6 : Boxplots of the number of exposed countries and number of exposed cases outside the UK for the three values of µ considered, in the case of targeting by 10 Latent individuals. Figure 7 : Boxplots of the number of exposed countries and number of exposed cases outside the UK for the three values of the number of cases necessary for detection considered, in the case of targeting by 5 Infectious individuals.
the disease that is capable of cycling through more generations in the same amount of time will necessarily generate more cases.
Detection Rate
We considered also the impact of varying the number of cases necessary for an outbreak to be detected, by considering a more efficient (only two cases necessary) and a less efficient (where 8 cases are necessary) scenario. The results for the UK and the top 20 affected countries in each scenario, 14 days after the attack, are summarized in Fig 7 and Fig 8 for the two seeding possibilities considered. As expected, in both cases, decreasing detection efficiency increases both the number of cases within each country and the respective outbreak probability, since the disease is left to progress further before detection is possible. Figure 8 : Boxplots of the number of exposed countries and number of exposed cases outside the UK for the three values of the number of cases necessary for detection considered, in the case of targeting by 10 latent individuals.
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No Immunity 20% Immunity
Days since detection Figure 9 : Boxplots of the number of exposed countries and number of exposed cases outside the UK for the two values of prior immunity considered, in the case of targeting by 5 Infectious individuals.
Days since detection Figure 10 : Boxplots of the number of exposed countries and number of exposed cases outside the UK for the two values of prior immunity considered, in the case of targeting by 10 Latent individuals.
Prior Immunity
The case of 20% immunity in population as a result of the vaccination campaign that successfully eradicated smallpox in the late seventies, was also considered. The results for the UK and the top 20 affected countries in each scenario, 14 days after the attack, are summarized in Fig 9 and Fig 10 for the two seeding possibilities considered. As expected, in both cases, immunity is able to reduce both the number of cases within each country and the respective outbreak probability, but is not sufficient to prevent the infection from spreading into other countries.
Initial Seeding
So far our results have been based on the assumption that the target city is London, UK. However, it is also important to consider the effect that a different target city would have on the final result.
No Immunity 20% Immunity
Days since detection Figure 11 : Boxplots of the number of exposed countries and number of exposed cases outside the US for the two values of prior immunity considered, in the case of targeting by 5 Infectious individuals in New York city. Fig 12 list the results obtained for the two levels of immunity considered in the case of seeding in New York city by 5 infectious and 10 Latent individuals, respectively.
New York, US

Fig 11 and
Paris, France
As a second initial condition in Europe, we consider the case of the seeding taking place in Paris, France. Fig  13 and Fig 14 list the results obtained for the two levels of immunity considered for seeding by 5 infectious and 10 Latent individuals, respectively.
No Immunity 20% Immunity
Days since detection Figure 12 : Boxplots of the number of exposed countries and number of exposed cases outside the US for the two values of prior immunity considered, in the case of targeting by 10 latent individuals in New York city.
Days since detection Figure 13 : Boxplots of the number of exposed countries and number of exposed cases outside France for the two values of prior immunity considered, in the case of targeting by 5 Infectious individuals in Paris.
Human mobility and the worldwide impact of intentional localized highly pathogenic virus release Figure 14 : Boxplots of the number of exposed countries and number of exposed cases outside France for the two values of prior immunity considered, in the case of targeting by 10 latent individuals in Paris.
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Days since detection Figure 15 : Boxplots of the number of exposed countries and number of exposed cases outside the UK for the values of p r considered, in the case of targeting by 5 Infectious individuals.
Probability of traveling during Rash period.
Finally, we consider varying the probability of traveling during the Rash period. Fig 15 and Fig 16 list the results obtained for the different traveling probabilities for seeding by 5 infectious and 10 Latent individuals, respectively.
Days since detection Figure 16 : Boxplots of the number of exposed countries and number of exposed cases outside the UK for the values of p r considered, in the case of targeting by 10 Latent individuals.
